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T he Court of Appeals of Maryland in State v. 
Gray, 344 Md. 417, 687 A.2d 660 
(1997), held that a nontestifying 
codefendant's confession does not 
violate a defendant's Sixth 
Amendment right to confront his 
accusers when the names of others 
implicated in the crime are deleted, 
and when the jury is instructed to 
consider the confession only with 
respect to the guilt of the confes-
sing codefendant. In its five to 
two opinion, the court placed great 
faith in the ability of juries to 
dichotomize evidence and to draw 
no impennissible conclusions from 
the deleted inferences. 
Stacey Williams was beaten by 
a group of six men and died as a 
result of his injuries. Incident to 
an investigation, Anthony Bell 
("Bell") was arrested and con-
fessed to the murder, implicating 
himself, Jacquin Vanlandingham 
("Jacquin"), and Kevin Dominic 
Gray ("Gray"). The court denied 
Gray's motions to sever his trial 
from Bell's or in the alternative to 
exclude Bell's confession from 
evidence. The trial court ordered 
the redaction of Jacquin's and 
Gray's names from the confession 
and instructed the jury to consider 
the evidence only against Bell. 
Although there was conflicting 
evidence regarding Gray's exact 
location at the time of the incident, 
the jury convicted Gray of invol-
untary manslaughter. The court 
sentenced him to ten years 
imprisonment. 
Gray appealed and argued that 
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the redacted confession was a 
violation of his Sixth Amendment 
right to cross-examine his ac-
cusers. The Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland agreed and 
reversed the lower court. The 
Court of Appeals of Maryland 
granted certiorari. 
Citing the Sixth Amendment, 
the court began its analysis by 
noting that in criminal trials, both 
federal and state, a defendant has 
the right to confront his or her 
accusers. Gray, 344 Md. at 420, 
687 A.2d at 662 (citing U.s. 
CONST. amend. VI). The ability to 
confront implies the right to cross-
examine. Id. (citing Pointer v. 
Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406-07 
(1965». Next, the court su-
mmarized the history of Supreme 
Court jurisprudence on the issue of 
admitting a nontestifying co-
defendant's confession. Gray at 
420-27,687 A.2d at 662-666. 
Initially, the Supreme Court 
held that it is possible for a jury to 
follow instructions, and limit a 
confession solely to the deter-
mination of the guilt of the con-
fessing codefendant. Id. at 421, 
687 A.2d at 662-63 (citing Bruton 
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v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 at 
126 (1968». In Bruton, the Court 
departed from this view holding 
that, notwithstanding a jury in-
struction, a confession of a 
nontestifying codefendant 
implicating a defendant by name 
violates the defendant's right to 
cross-examine the witness. Gray 
at 421, 687 A.2d at 663 (citing 
Bruton, 391 U.S. at 126). The 
Bruton ruling, the court continued, 
illustrated the Court's concern that 
despite instructions "such a non-
admissible declaration cannot be 
wiped from the brains of the 
jurors." Gray at 421,687 A.2d at 
663, (quoting Paoli v. United 
States, 352 U.S. 232, 247-48 
(1957». While acknowledging the 
judicial economy joint trials 
afford, the probative value of a 
confession and the integrity of the 
jury system, the Bruton Court held 
that jury instructions are not an 
"adequate substitute" for the con-
stitutional right to cross-
examination. Gray at 422-23, 687 
A.2d at 663. 
The practice of redacting the 
names of others implicated in the 
confession was challenged in 
Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 
200 (1987). Gray at 423, 687 
A.2d at 663. Marsh limited 
Bruton and held it to be a "narrow 
exception" to the presumption that 
juries will follow instructions 
accurately. Gray at 424-425,687 
A.2d at 664. There is a distinction, 
the Court held, between confes-
sions directly implicating co-
defendants and confessions where 
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a codefendant's guilt is inferred. 
Id. at 426, 687 A.2d at 665, 
(citting Marsh, 481 U.S. at 208). 
In the latter case, an instruction 
can be adequate to dissuade juries 
from making the inference. Id. at 
426, 687 A.2d at 665 (citing 
Marsh 481 U.S. at 208). In 
addition, the Marsh Court held that 
judicial economy and the ad-
vantage of consistent verdicts in 
joint trials warrant the ad-
missibility of confessions where a 
codefendant is not named. Gray at 
426, 687 A.2d at 665 (citing 
Marsh 481 U.S. at 208-210). 
Marsh, however, did not rule 
on the issue of the admissibility of 
a confession where the co-
defendants' names are redacted. 
Gray at 426, 687 A.2d at 665. 
Currently, the Maryland court 
continued, there is a considerable 
split among the circuits regarding 
the issue reserved in Marsh. Gray 
at 426, 687 A.2d at 665. Some 
courts have held that if a co-
defendant's confession tends to 
incriminate a defendant, when 
used in light of other evidence 
presented, it creates a substantial 
risk that the jury will improperly 
use the confession to determine the 
defendant's culpability. Id. at 427, 
687 A.2d at 665. Other jurisdic-
tions have held that a confession is 
admissible if it does not implicate 
the defendant by name, or if the 
defendant's name is deleted from 
the confession. Id. at 427, 687 
A.2d at 665-666. 
The Maryland court rejected 
both approaches holding that the 
former undermined the long held 
presumption that juries will follow 
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instructions faithfully. Id. at 427-
428, 687 A.2d at 666. The latter 
approach is equally flawed, the 
court stated, because in some 
cases, notwithstanding instruc-
tions, juries might still conclude 
that the deleted name is that of the 
defendant. Id. at 428, 687 A.2d at 
666. Sometimes the inferential 
step that juries must make to link 
the defendant is so small that it is 
effectively nonexistent. Id. at 428, 
687 A.2d at 666. 
In suggesting a third approach, 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
first reaffirmed the presumption 
that juries will follow instructions 
and will resist impermissible infer-
ences. Id. at 429, 687 A.2d at 667. 
There are those cases, however, 
where such inference is so compel-
ling that jurors will be unable to 
follow the court's instruction. Id. 
at 429,687 A.2d at 666-67 (citing 
United States v. Pendegraph, 791 
F.2d 1462 (11th Cir. 1991) 
(though the codefendant's confes-
sion was redacted, the jury could 
infer that the defendant was the 
accomplice simply because there 
was no other possibility)). There-
fore, the court concluded, in order 
to overcome the presumption that 
jurors will ignore or will be unable 
to follow court instructions, the 
urge to make the unauthorized 
deduction must be "compelling, 
inevitable and subject to little or 
no debate." Id. at 430, 687 A.2d at 
667. 
Turning to the facts of the 
instant case, the court reviewed 
Bell's confession and noted that he 
identified three of the six partici-
pants. Id. at 431,687 A.2d at 667-
668. Although the jury could have 
inferred from the testimony that 
one of the three unidentified 
persons was Gray, Bell's confes-
sion did not compel such an 
inference. Id. at 432, 687 A.2d at 
668. Therefore, the strong pre-
sumption that the jury will follow 
the court's instructions was not 
overcome and a Bruton violation 
did not occur. Id. at 434, 687 A.2d 
at 669. The defense's argument 
that the jury might make the infer-
ence was insufficient. Id. 
All dangers of hearsay are 
present in a nontestifying co-
defendant's confession: (1) erron-
eous memory; (2) faulty percep-
tion; (3) insincerity; and (4) am-
biguity. The judicial economy 
afforded by joint trials in an over-
burdened legal system is neverthe-
less critical. The Court of Appeals 
of Maryland in Gray thoughtfully 
balanced all conflicting interests 
and arrived at the best holding 
possible under the circumstances. 
